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RECENT CASES
AERIAL LAW-CARRIERS-AIRLINES

AS COMMON CARRIERs-POwER OF

AIR CARRIER TO CONTRACT FOR ITS RELEASE FROM LIABILiTY-Defendant
company, for a special rate, accepted gold for carriage by airplane to London
under a contract the printed terms of which were, inter alia, (I) that the company was not a common carrier, (2) that it reserved the right to refuse to accept
any goods for carriage, and (3) that freight was carried only at sender's risk,
the company accepting no responsibility for loss. The gofd was lost, allegedly
due to defendant's negligence. Held, that defendant was a private carrier, and
that liability was precluded by the terms of the contract. Aslan z. Imperial Airways Limited, 149 L. T. 276 (Eng. 1933).
The present court clearly indicated' that carriers utilizing airplanes as a
means of transportation may be classified as common carriers, and consequently
subject to the common law liability of insurership, providing that there 2is a profession of willingness to carry for all persons without discrimination. While
this is in accord with the few American decisions 3 involving air carriers, the
court, in declaring the defendant company a private carrier, considered as conclusive the words used by the defendant in its contract wherein it disclaimed
its willingness to carry for the general public ifidifferently. To ascertain the
status of a carrier by evidence which excludes an examination of the actual
conditions under which its business is operated would be to permit a common
carrier in fact to enjoy the legal incidents of a private carrier merely by asserting in its contracts that it is a private carrier. Attempts by carriers in the past
to escape their normal liabilities by such a camouflage of words have been unsuccessful; 4 and in view of the increasingly frequent use of this device by airlines P--as typically illustrated by the contract in the principal case-the court
would have done well to attach a minimum significance to the words used, and
to inspect carefully instead the actual character of the defendant's business
'Principal case at 278.
'This is the characteristic distinguishing common from private carriers. Gisbourn v.
Hurst, i Salk. 249 (Eng. 1710); Jackson Arch. Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y. 34, 52
N. E. 665 (1899); Hissem v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N. E. 8o8 (1925); McIntyre v.
Harrison, 172 Ga. 65, 157 S. E. 499 (1931).
'There is but one American case holding that an air carrier is a common carrier.
Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 Pac. (2d) 933 (1932). But there is dictum to this
effect in two other cases. Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 5th,
Although
1925) ; North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 213 Ala. lO2, lO4 So. 21 (1925).
the air carriers in these two cases were held to be private carriers, the reasons advanced were
that the flights were by special arrangement, and that there were no circumstances from
which a willingness to carry all who applied might be inferred. See Harriman, Carriage of
Passengers by Air (193o) i J. AIR LAW 33; Greer, Civil Liability of an Aviator as Carrier
of Goods and Passengers (193o) I J. AIR LAw 241, 244 et seq.; Note (193o) i Am LAW
REV. 407, 410; Allen, Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers (1931) 2 J. AIR
LAW 325. If in all other respects the carrier has assumed the characteristics defining common carriers, the particular kind of vehicle used has been considered immaterial. Express
Cases, 117 U. S. I, 6 Sup. Ct. 542 (1885); Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y.,
228 N. Y. 475, 127 N. E. 584 (1g2o); see Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. Smoker Merchandise
Co., IOO Ark. 37, 40, 139 S. W. 68o, 683 (1911).
'The following cases have indicated that what it elects in fact to do and not what it
purports by words to be, determines whether a particular business is a common carrier.
Railroad v. Lockvood, 84 U. S. 357, 376 (1873) ; Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S.
252, 36 Sup. Ct. 583 (1915) ; Davis v. People, 79 Colo. 642, 247 Pac. Soi (1926). See GODDARD, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILAENTS AND CARRIERS (2d ed. 1928) § 198.
'For examples with discussions, see Edmunds, Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts
(193o) I J. AIR LAW 321; Zollman, Aircraft as Common Carriers (193o) i J. AIR LAW 19o.
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operations in determining the company's status. Thus the fact that the company
was organized for the very purpose of offering an air transportation service,
that it published regular tariffs for carriage over established routes, are considerations present in the instant case, 6 but neglected by the court, leading to the
inference of an intention to serve all who should apply.' But irrespective of
whether defendant was a common or a private carrier, the present decision is
open to a further criticism in that'it gives validity to a contract which in terms
excludes all liability, whereas the cases are uniform in permitting carriers to
circumscribe their common law liability within reasonable limits only." Although
what is deemed reasonable varies in different jurisdictions,9 it is unanimously
agreed that contracts stipulating against all responsibility, like the one in the
principal case, are of no legal effect 1o being contrary to a well established public
policy. Both in ignoring the unreasonableness of the contract in question and
in failing adequately to inquire into defendant's status, the treatment of this
case leads to an unsatisfactory result. Nor would it be a salutary policy to create an exception in favor of airlines on the ground that their future growth is
dependent upon a protection from onerous liabilities for, it would seem that
even when they are engaged as common carriers, they are amply safeguarded 11
by the rule that they may by reasonable contractual exceptions abridge their
absolute liability.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS-LAw GOVERNING SURVIVAL

IN SUIT AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR TORT OF DECEDENT COMMITTED IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTION-A Pennsylvania statute provides that "[executors] shall be liable
to be sued . . . in any . . . action which might have been brought against . . .
decedent if he had lived." 1 New York courts apply the common law rule that
personal actions abate upon the death of the defendant.2 Two suits were brought
against executors in Pennsylvania for injuries suffered in New York for which

decedents would have been liable. (I) Held, that since New York law did not
IPrincipal case at 276, 277.
'Harriman, mtpra note 3, at 34; see (1925) 24 MICH. L. REV. 186; (1926) 24 MICH. L.
REv. 619.
I See Alair v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 53 Minn. 16o, 54 N. W. 1072 (1873) ; I HUTcHINsON, A TRFATISE IN THE LAW OF CARRIERS (3d ed. 19o6) §§ 388-389.
In England all carriers may limit liability except for gross negligence, wilfil torts or
fraud. Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald. 21 (182o) ; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443 (1841) ;
Beal v. South Devon Ry. Co., ii L. T. 184 (1864). In the United States the majority of
courts will give no effect to contracts limiting liability for negligence. Railroad v. Lockwood,
supra note 4, at 357; Eckert v. Penna. R. Co., 211 Pa. 267, 6o Atl. 781 (19o5) ; Walrath v.
American Ry. Express Co., 217 App. Div. 83, 216 N. Y. Supp. 545 (1926). Some state
courts, in accord with the English view, will permit contracts limiting liability for other than
gross negligence. Lawson v. Chicago, St. P. etc. Co., 64 Wis. 447, 24 N. W. 618 (1885);
see Chicago etc. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 Ill. 9, 61 N. E. 1095 (1901); Donlon Bros.
v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 Cal. 763, 91 Pac. 6o3 (19o7).
" In many cases language identical with that used by defendant has been held to be
indicative of a total and therefore unreasonable exemption from liability. England: M'Manus
v. Lancashire & Y. Ry. Co., 4 H. & N. 327 (859); Martin v. Gt. Indian Ry. Co., 17
L. T. 349 (1857). United States: Empire Transp. Co. v. Wamsutta Oil Ref. & Min. Co.,
63 Pa. 14 (1869) ; Nicholas v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 370 (1882).
' That this rule is applicable to and works no hardship on carriers by air, see Moore,
Aerial Navigation (19o8) 12 LAW NOTES 108, lO9; Note (1929) 14 MARQUETTE L. REv. 34;
Allen, supra note 3, at 327 et seq.; ZOLLMAN, LAW OF THE AIR (I927) § 96.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 772.
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (1909) § 120.
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provide for the survival of a right of action, no right survived.

Sumner v.

Brown, 312 Pa. 124. (2) Held, that whether or not a cause of action survived
was a question to be determined by the law of the state where the action is
brought, therefore the right of action survived against the estate. Chase v.
Ormsby, 65 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933), rez'g 3 F. Supp. 68o (E. D. Pa.
'933).
The courts in the principal cases are in accord as to fundamental propositions
of the law of Conflict of Laws: both consider the plaintiff as trying to enforce
a right which accrued to him in another jurisdiction; 3 each follows the American
rule that the lex fori governs questions of procedure, 4 while in matters of substance the lex loci is paramount. , These rules must be applied to one concept:
the plaintiff's right. Disagreement upon the nature and extent of that right
underlies the contradictory decisions issued. The Pennsylvania court builds its
reasoning around the idea that the right given by the law of New York to the
injured party is a right to compensation from the wrongdoer, and from no one
else; 6 the federal court seems to believe that the plaintiff possesses a right to
compensation for the wrong done, enforceable against the wrongdoer or against
his estate, if such recovery is permitted by the forum.' In reason and by analogy
the former seems to be the more tenable view. Whatever right the plaintiff
possessed accrued to him in New York.8 Its substance and extent depended upon
the defendant's obligation, created by the law of that jurisdiction because of his
wrong. That obligation attaching to the defendant existed only as provided by
the law governing its birth :9 by the provisions of that law it died with the person
of the wrongdoer, and with it any right to compensation founded upon the wrong.
Although argument by analogy is particularly hazardous in this field,' 0 it must be
pointed out that these propositions are applied by courts to obligations-and the
co-extensive rights which they support-based upon death statutes." These
33 BEALE, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1902) 501, §§ 1-5; GOODRICH, CONrFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 92. For discussion of the nature of this theory of the law of Conflict of Laws, see Note (1926) 11 MINi. L. REv. 44.
'CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT

(Am.

§ 612; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 81.

L. Inst. 1931) Proposed Final Draft No. 2,

ICONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Proposed Final Draft No. 3,

§ 418; GOODRICH, loc. cit. supra note 3. Whatever may be thought of the distinction between
substance and procedure, "[it] is made by the courts, and the lawyer must figure it out as
best he can". Id. § 81, n. 2.
Principal case (i) at 127, 128.
Principal case (2) at 522.
'WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 19o5) § 478b. The best analysis of these rights

may be found in BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) c. 5; see also Story, J., in Le Roy v.
Crowninshield, 2 Mason 151 (C. C. U. S. 1820).

9
Holmes, J., in Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R., 194 U. S. 12o, 126 (19o4). Accord, Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, iio, i2o N. E. 198, 2o (ii8).
" For instance, capital cannot be made from the fact that the statute of limitations is
treated as a question for the law of the lex fori, from which the inference seems to be that
the right may be pursued after the expiration of the obligation under the law of the forum.
That rule exists solely on the basis of precedent dating back to times when British insular
prejudice, rather than legal analysis, dictated its adoption: E. G. L[orenzen], The Statute of
Liwitations and the Conflict of Laws (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 492. The suggestion that this
rule of precedent authorizes any inference concerning the nature of obligations and rights is
examined carefully, and repudiated, by Story, J., in Le Roy v. Crowninshield, supra note 8;

see also Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1112.

'Usher v. West Jersey R. R., 126 Pa. 2o6, 17 Atl. 597 (1889) (recovery denied by the
Pennsylvania court in suit by widow for death of husband caused in New Jersey because
obligation created by death statute in latter jurisdiction ran only to "personal representatives"
of deceased) ; Needham, Adm'x, v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38 Vt. 294 (1865) (right to sue held
non-existent since not provided for by statute of lex loci imposing obligation, although the
law of Vermont, the forum, permitted recovery under similar facts); GOODRICH, op. cit.
supra note 3, §§ 99-102.
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obligations differ not a whit from those imposed by the common law; the same
rules should be applied to each. Further, the measure of damages, involving
definite limitation upon the obligation created, is held by a considerable majority
to be decided by rules of the lex loci." Results in both these situations are altogether inconsistent with the premises and conclusion of the federal court. Although rational considerations indicate that decisions should follow the line taken
by the Pennsylvania court, it is a fact that decisions upon the instant situation
are evenly divided. 3 The divergence of conclusion from identical premises emphasizes one proposition: that formal rules of law, e. g., the distinction between
substance and procedure, mean little when applied to concepts as elusive as that
of "right".
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-BANKS AND BANKING-STATE'S PRIORITY AS
CREDITOR-UNcONSTITUTIONALITY OF EMERGENCY BANKING AcT-The Mary-

land emergency banking act passed March 4, 1933,' provided that all banks should
be placed in the control and management of the commissioner of banking. In
those which were not permitted to reopen on an unrestricted basis, all unsecured
deposits of the state, county, municipality, or other political subdivision, or of an
officer thereof as receiver of any bank, were exempted from withdrawal restrictions and granted all the rights of new deposits. A bill was brought by depositors
in a bank remaining under restriction, alleging its insolvency, to enjoin such
preferences. Held, that such preferences were unconstitutional as an impairment
of the obligation of the contracts of other depositors.' Ghingher v. Pearson, 168
Atl. 105 (Md. 1933).
If this statute was declaratory of the common law priority of the state, there
was no prejudice to existing contracts, for they were entered into subject to such
priority; if it created a new priority extending beyond that which existed previously in Maryland, it was, in view of the probability of the insufficiency of the
bank's assets to meet all its obligations, an impairment of contract rights of other
depositors to the extent that their claims were deferred. At common law the
state, though not its subdivisions,' had a right of priority of payment as against
otherwise equal creditors out of a debtor's property so long as the debtor retained
title to it,4 even though it was in custodia legis.' A recent Maryland decision,
however, announced that the state's priority was lost when the property of an
insolvent bank had, under statutory provisions,' passed into the hands of the

'Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R., supra note 9;

1905) § 478c;

CoNflict OF LAws
(1917) 3 IowA L. BULL. I.

WHARTON,

Goodrich, Damages for a Foreign Wrong

(3d ed.

"Only two previous cases cover the instant situation; they are contradictory in their
decisions: Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (D. Conn. 1896) (holding that the lex furi govcrns) ; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928) (applying the lea loci). Neither
was cited in the instant cases. The view of the Pennsylvania court is adopted by the CoNyuIcr or LAWs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Proposed Final Draft No. 3, § 426.
'Laws

of Md. 1933, c. 46.

These were to be incorporated in the Maryland Code, art.

ii as2 §§7IA to 71Q.

U. S. CONsTrruTI0o. Art. I. § io.
'Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 3o7 (D. Ore. 1926) ; In re Valley Deposit and Trust Co., 311 Pa. 495, 167 Atl. 42 (933) ; County Court v. Mathews, 99
W. Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399 (1925).

Hence it was defeated by a bona fide assignment for the benefit of creditors. State v.
President, etc., of Bank of Maryland, 6 Gill & J. 205 (Md. 1834) ; State v. Foster, 5 Wyo.
199, 38 Pac. 926 (1895) ; King (in aid of Braddock) v. Watson, 3 Price 6 (Eng. 1816).
I Marshall v. People, 254 U. S. 380, 41 Sup. Ct. 143 (1920) ; State ex rel. Rankin v.

Madison State Bank, 68 Mont. 342, 218 Pac. 652 (1923) ; Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 128 (Eng.
1832).

"MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. ii, § 9.
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commissioner of banking as receiver, on the ground that the property was beyond
reach of lien-creating process.' Although this purported to be merely an expression of the common law rule, the same result could not have been reached under
that rule, for, inasmuch as in Maryland a receiver gets no title," the property was
felt bound
really only in custodia legis. The court in the instant case nevertheless
9
by its earlier reasoning in this almost identical situation, although the earlier
decision denied priority not to the state, but to a surety seeking subrogation, a
result reached elsewhere on a ratio decidendi not denying, but even expressly
affirming the state's priority.'0 Other differences between the common law
and statutory priority might have been disposed of :' under the rule of interpreting statutes in favor of their constitutionality if in any way reasonably possible."2 But, under its test of whether property was beyond reach of lien-creating
process as determining whether the priority has been lost, the court was obliged
to find an impairment of the contract rights of other depositors to equality of
payment with the state in this situation. Nor could the statute have been justified
as an exercise of police power in an emergency to provide the state with immediate funds, for, the court pointed out, a classification of those whose rights were
through a
to be infringed as that small number of citizens most quickly reached
3
The court,
preference over their private bank accounts is wholly arbitrary.'
however, might well have re-examined the common law rule as to the conditions under which the state's priority was lost, instead of following unquestioningly its earlier reasoning, and have held that the statute created no new right.
In view of the emergency character of the legislation, it is to be regretted that it
did not, and it seems unlikely that the decision will have much influence on courts
in other jurisdictions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INcoME TAX-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GRADUATED
INCOME TAX AS TAX ON PROPERTY-By popular referendum a graduated income

tax was adopted in Washington.' The state constitution provided that "all taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class of property" and that "the word 'property'

'Public Indemnity Co. v. Page, 161 Md. 239, 156 AtI. 791 (1931).
'Dietrich v. O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 Atl. 717 (1914); Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md.
222, 9 Atl. 632 (1887) ; Ellicott v. Warford, 4 Md. 8o (1853).
"The terms of the instant act are indistinguishable, unless as wzfore comprehensive, from
those in the code, supra note 6. Both acts specifically provided that the property was not
subject to lien, attachment, execution, or distraint.
"0The public weal, the reason for recognizing state's priority, is but little concerned with
recognition of such a right in a surety. Hence subrogation, a purely equitable doctrine, cannot be invoked by the surety.

South Phila. Bank's Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433, 145 Atl. 520

(1929).

" Such provisions as that which granted priority merely to unsecured funds expressed
no legislative intent to create a new priority, since within the limits of the common law rule
of extension to all funds. Nor was such an intent expressed by provisions granting the right
to funds of state subdivisions and funds deposited by the commissioner of banking (which
extensions were held unconstitutional) since these can be interpreted merely as indicative of
a mistaken conception of the extent of the existing common law priority. This is the approach and argument of the dissenting judges, principal case, p. 11S.
"See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401, 36 Sup. Ct. 658, 659 (1916);
Keiningham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 322, IO9 Atl. 65, 66 (1919).
TUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) § 43.

BLACK, AME.RICAx CoxsT-

" The test of the power of the legislature to classify without denying equal rights is
whether the classification rests upon distinctions not arbitrary, but reasonable with regard to
the object sought by the legislation. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 35
Sup. Ct. 675 (1915). Cooi.E', CoSTITUTrIoxAL LAW (Bruce's ed. 1919) 285.

'Laws of Wash. 1933, c. 5, P. 49.
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as used herein shall mean and include everything, whether tangible or intangible,
subject to ownership". 2 Petitioner sought to have the State Tax Commission
enjoined from enforcing the act. Held, that an injunction should issue since the
tax was unconstitutional.

Culliton v. Chase, 25 Pac. (2d) 8I (Wash. 1933).

In deciding whether a graduated tax on income is constitutional within the
provisions of the particular state constitution involved courts have traditionally
considered the question of whether income is property. 3 In the instant case the
court held that income was something subject to ownership and hence property
within the provision of the constitution requiring all taxes on the same class of
property to be uniform. 4 Other courts, giving property a similar definition, have
held a graduated income tax constitutional by various formule, as an excise tax,'
or on the theory that income, while a species of property, was not property within
the meaning of the particular constitution,' or that an income tax was in reality
a tax on the person measured by the amount of income received.' This confusion
in decision results from an attempt by the courts to classify income which involves
various elements: the goods from which and by which gain accrues, the personal
services and initiative of the person taxed, and accretion over a period of time,
as one thing-property. A tax on such a complex aggregate cannot be wholly
a tax on property, nor a personal tax, nor an excise. It is submitted that an
income tax should be treated as sui generis,s with incidents of its own and no
attempt should be made to force it into a stereotyped mould. In passing on the
constitutionality of such a tax the issue should not depend on mere questions of
form and definition, but the courts should consider the more fundamental questions of social and economic expediency involved.9 As state systems of taxation
need revision, an income tax should be held constitutional unless it clearly appears
that the particular constitution prohibits such a tax. Moreover, this would be more
'WASH. R a. STAT. (Remington, 1932) Vol. I,p.526.
'Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v.Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56 (192o); State v.
Pinder, 3o Del. 416, io8 At. 43 (1919) ; Hattiesburg Grocery Co.v.Robertson, 126 Miss. 34,
88 So. 4 (1921).

'Accord: Hart v. Tax Comm., 240 Mass. 37, 132 N. E. 621 (1921) (an income tax is
on the property from which the income is derived) ;Eliasberg Bros. v. Grimes, supra note 3
(but the court recognized that income as something capable of ownership is not property) ;
State v. Pinder, supra note 3 (an income tax is a tax on income as property in the recipient's
hands) ; Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 182 N. E. 9o9 (1932) ; cf. Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
'Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W. 72o (1925); Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v.
Robertson, supra note 3; In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N. H. 611, 93 Atl. 311 (1915).
'Featherstone v. Norman, 17o Ga. 370, 153 S. E. 58 (193o); Diefendorf v. Gallet, 5,
Idaho 619, io P. (2d) 307 (1932) (property as used in the constitution held to mean
corpus or estate and not annual gain therefrom) ; Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck,
275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W. 196 (1918) (framers of the constitution did not intend property to
include income, but meant property that could be measured in value and taxed independent
of the owner).
Crescent M'f'g Co. v. S. C. Tax Comm., 129 S. C. 480, 124 S. E. 761 (1924) ; Norris v.
Cary, 205 Wis. 626, 238 N. W. 415 (1931) ; see Succession of Mercier, 42 La. Ann. 1135,
1143, 8 So. 732, 734 (189o). Courts have held that a lessor could not recover the amount of
income tax paid from the lessee where the lease provided that the lessee should pay all taxes
levied on real estate, or assessed on any interest of the lessor in it, or which the lessor shall
be required to pay by reason of his interest in the property on the ground that an income tax
is not a tax imposed on any interest in the real estate. Young v. Ill. Athletic Club, 310 Ill.
75, 141 N. E. 369 (923) ; Woodruff v. Oswego Starch Factory, 177 N. Y. 23, 68 N. E. 994
(19o3); Catawissa Ry. Co. v. Phila. & R. Co., 255 Pa. 269, 99 Atl. 807 (ii6).
8 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 2o6, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193 (192o) ; Brown, The
17 MINN. L. REv. 127; (1932) 46 HARV. L. REy. 339.
Nature of the Income Tax (933)
' O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, 25 P. (2d) 114 (Mont. 1933) (held that
the legislature intended to impose a tax on income as income and not as property and as the
tax was based on sound social and economic principles, the tax was constitutional although
the Montana Constitution defined property as broadly as the Washington Constitution).
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consistent with the theory that state constitutions are limitations on the power of
the people and not grants of power.10 In the instant case as the system of taxation
in Washington was in a chaotic state, and the people by popular referendum, relying on the tax from income, reduced the tax on real property,"1 the tax might
preferably have been held constitutional. As the tax was only on income from
property within the state and from acts done within the state, if the court needed
a formula to uphold the law, it could have been held an excise,1 2 and thus the
constitutional provisions as to uniformity would not have applied.
CONTRACTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-"FAMILY
FOR SEPARATION AGREEENT-Husband

ERATION

SETTLEMENT" AS CONSID-

and wife (plaintiff here)

agreed under seal 1 to live apart, the husband promising to pay a monthly sum
to the wife for the maintenance of the children until the latter should be selfsupporting. The parties were later divorced and the husband died. While the
children were not yet self-supporting plaintiff brought an action against the estate
of the husband for payments due since his death. Held, that plaintiff could
recover, the "family settlement" being sufficient consideration for the husband's
promise, and the obligation surviving 2 the death of the promisor. Huffman v.
Huffman-, 311 Pa. 123, 166 At. 570 (1933).

In view of the normally validating effect of the seal in Pennsylvania, 3 it is
surprising that the court in the principal case completely ignored the seal and
preferred to hold the promise legally effective by reason of the "family settlement"
as consideration. From the precedents cited,4 the unusual consideration here
found appears to be either that of "moral obligation" or an agreement to refrain
from suit., The first has of course long been disregarded as valid consideration
" In re Pomeroy, 51 Mont. 119, 151 Pac. 333 (915). Also, every reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law. State ex iel. v. State Highway
Comm., 89 Mont. 205, 296 Pac. 1033 (1931).
Laws of Wash. 1933, c. 4, P. 47.
Such was the position taken by Justice Blake, dissenting in the instant case at 86. In
State v. Yelle, 25 P. (2d) 92 (Wash. 1933), the Washington court held that a tax on all
occupations except agricultural pursuits, and personal or professional services, measured by
amount of income, was not a property tax, but an excise and hence constitutional. The court
notes that "the law is, perhaps, not perfect", but in view of the emergency in Washington
taxation, the law will be held constitutional.
But the agree1 Nowhere in the opinion is it stated that the agreement was under seal.
ment itself, as set forth in appellant's transcript of record, page 5a, shows that in fact it was
sealed by both parties.
The question of survivability was disposed of in accordance with the settled rule that in
the absence of a contrary intention a contractual duty is binding upon the estate of the promisor unless the duty was so personal that only the promisor himself could perform it. Dumont v. Heighton, 14 Ariz. 25, 123 Pac. 3o6 (1912) ; Drummond v. Crane, 159 Mass. 577, 35
N. E. 90 (1893) ; Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913) ; 3 WmLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1940, 1945. In the principal case the expression of the parties chiefly relevant to the termination of the contract limited its duration solely by the ability of the children
to support themselves-a factor wholly independent of the length of time the father might
live.
. Anderson v. Best, 176 Pa. 498, 35 Atl. 194 (1896). There is in Pennsylvania no statute
modifying the common law effect of the seal, although its sanctity might at times seem questioned by erroneous expressions to the effect that a seal "imports" or "presumes" a consideration. See Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. 31, 36 (1884). See also (1932) 8I U. OF PA. L.
REv. 216. A sealed instrument is of course valid by reason of its form alone. Walker v.
Walker, 35 N. C. 335 (1852) ; I WILIS oN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 109.
'Burkholder's Appeal, supra note 3; Lineaweaver's Estate, 284 Pa. 384, 131 Atl. 378
(1925) ; Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 Atl. 236 (1925).
' "In the present case, the offer made was induced not only by the moral and legal obligation of support for the wife, but by the desire of the decedent to avoid litigation. This furnishes ample consideration, as would an agreement to withdraw such proceedings if already
instituted." Lineaweaver's Estate, supra note 4, at 391, 13I Ati. at 380.
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in all but a negligible number of jurisdictions." The second is a more satisfactory
view since it does no violence to the facts to imply a promise on the wife's part
to accept the particularsum agreed upon in lieu of an undetermined amount which
the husband could be compelled to pay by reason of his statutory obligation I to
support the children. Furthermore, even though the agreement thus became one
to define I the existing but inchoate obligation of the husband, there was nothing
to prevent the latter from making an effective promise to perform more than his
legal duty would have required, if he expressed an intent to do so. Consequently,
while the statutory duty of the husband to support the children ceased upon his
death, he could nevertheless agree to prolong the obligation if he thought it worth
the price of the wife's promise in return. It may be, however, that the categorical
statement "the family settlement was, itself, ample consideration" 9 is intended
to eliminate in separation agreements the necessity for any consideration, in the
conventional sense, since all such agreements must by hypothesis involve a
"family settlement". 0 It is unfortunate, in view of these possibilities, that the
principal case must remain of doubtful authority both because of the lack of
clearer language and the presence of the seal, even though this latter obvious and
conclusive method of solution was disregarded.

CORPORATIONS-MERGER

AND CONSOLIDATION-LIABILITY

OF A TRANS-

FEREE OF ALL ASSETS OF A CORPORATE TRANSFEROR FOR CLAImS AGAINST THE
LATTER-The X Corporation, having converted plaintiff's shares, conveyed all

its assets to the defendant corporation, which, in return, issued its shares to the
shareholders of X, and undertook "to pay, satisfy and discharge all the indebtedness and liabilities" of X. Held, that defendant was liable in trover for the tort
of X, on the theory of a "de facto merger". Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, I68 Atl. 87
(Del. 1933).

A bona fide purchase of the business and assets of one corporation by
another will not ordinarily subject the transferee to liability for claims against the
transferor. 1 Where, however, the consideration for the transfer is the issue of
shares in the transferee directly to stockholders of the transferor, liability has
been imposed, even in the absence of any agreement by the traisferee to assume
liability, on various theories: (I) "de facto merger or consolidation";2 (2)
'Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383 (1876); Eastwood v. Kenyon, ii A. & E. 438
(Eng. 1840). The language of some Pennsylvania decisions would seem to support the doctrine of moral consideration, though in most instances some other and valid consideration can
be found. Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 367 (1855) ; Marshall v. Marshall, 61 Pa. Super.
513 (1915).

See in general Note (1932)

16 MINN. L. REv. 8o8.

PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 18, §§ 1251, 1252.

'Once the parties have thus between themselves agreed upon a sum which shall constitute the husband's obligation it is settled that the wife will be barred from relief under the
statute. Commonwealth v. Richards, 131 Pa. 209, 18 Atl. lOO7 (x89o).
IPrincipal case at 126, 166 Atl. at 572.

a'This conclusion would be not unusual in view of the frequent statements in Pennsylvania decisions to the effect that family settlements are especially favored by the law and
will be upheld whenever possible. See Wistar's Appeal, 8o Pa. 484, 495 (1876) ; Fishblate
v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 458, 86 Atl. 469, 472 (1913) ; Miller v. Miller, supra note 4, at 417,
131 Atl. at 237.

'Chase v. Michigan Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 8o N. W. 717 (1899) (denies tort recovery
against transferee which also owned entire capital stock of transferor) ; Ozan Lumber Co.
v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 Fed. 161, 285 Fed. 395 (D. Del. 1922) (denies recovery for
breach of contract by transferor).
' City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas & Oil Co., 81 Kan. 717, io6 Pac. 1025 (1910).
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transferee regarded as a "mere continuation" of transferor ;3 (3) "identity" of
the two corporations; 4 (4) fraudulent conveyance;1 (5) equitable lien 6 or trust 7
in the assets conveyed. Legal labels aside, the real reason for these decisions is a
recognition of the hardship in compelling plaintiff to resort to the cumbersome
alternative remedies available to him: legal action against the debtor corporation
followed by execution on or a bill in equity against the property in the hands of
the transferee, or suit against the scattered stockholders of the transferor, who
have in effect withdrawn their capital contributions before creditors have been
paid.8 The justice of the decisions may well be questioned where the shareholders
of transferor and transferee are not the same." The corporations are not identical; 1°0 the transferee has not agreed to become liable for claims against the
transferor; statutes governing merger and consolidation, which usually make
express provision for debts of the constituent companies," have not been complied
with; yet for the purposes of this action the new corporation is treated as though
it had perpetrated the wrong for which plaintiff seeks recovery.: 2 Perhaps this
can be explained on the basis of a public policy akin to that behind the Bulk Sales
Acts; but few courts have suggested that such an analogy is the ratio decidendi
of these decisions.: Furthermore, a statutory provision authorizing corporations
to sell all their assets seems inconsistent with the existence of such a policy.' 4
The situation is clarified where the transferee agrees to assume the obligations of
the transferor-no reason of fairness or equity forbids the enforcement of this
promise. It follows that since the facts of the instant case include an undertaking
'Discussed in Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 Fed. 161, 164-65 (D.
Del. I92).

"Langhorne v. Richmond City Ry., 91 Va. 364, 22 S. E. 357 (1895) (plaintiff permitted
to amend declaration by adding averment of identity) ; see Camden Interstate Ry. v. Lee, 27
Ky. L. Rep. 75, 76, 84 S. W. 332, 333 (9o5) (transaction described as change of name) ;
(1928) 26 Micn. L. REV. 913. Contra: Abilene Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 41 Tex. Civ.
App. 342, 91 S. W. 6o7 (19o6).

'Even where no fraudulent intent appears. See McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., 156
Atl. 193, 195 (Del. Ch. 1931). But cf. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., supra
note 3, at 172-73 (requiring more than mere allegation of intercorporate transfer to establish

fraud).

'See Berthold v. Holladay-Klotz, etc., Co., 91 Mo. App. 233, 238,

240 (1901).

"For a complete discussion of this approach see Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach.
Co., supra note 3, 166-172. Trust language is employed in Grenell v. Detroit Gas Co., 112
Mich. 7o, 7o N. W. 413 (1897) ; Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 26o Fed. 159 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1919) (limiting defendant's liability to the value of assets received) ; and so many

other cases that it is apparent that trust law is once more being used as a stop-gap, as it was
in the field of third party beneficiaries.

' For these and other possible remedies see the instant case, 95-96; Note (193o) 44
H.Av. L. REv. 260.
' Since those shareholders in the transferee who were not shareholders in the transferor
paid value for the assets by the issue of shares, and now must pay again by bearing the cost
of the transferor's tort.
"' A classification of the various forms of corporate combination in this connection is
given in Vicksburg, etc., Tel. Co. v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 79 Miss. 341, 354, 30 So. 725, 728
(igoi), and adopted in Note (19o8) ii L. R. A. (N. s.) 111g.
I GENERAL CoRPORATION LAW, DEL. REV. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 6o.
By permitting direct legal action against it. Accord: Ledbetter v. Sunflower State Oil
Co., 96 Kan. 636, 152 Pac. 763 (1915) (no assumption of obligations) ; Du Pont & Co. v.
Smith, 252 Fed. 491 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918). Contra: Whipple v. Union Pac. Ry., 28 Kan. 474
(1882) (holds that where there is no assumption, a direct action at law could not be maintained even where a de jure consolidation has been effected).
a' Note (193o) 44 HAuv. L. REv. 260, especially footnotes 12 and 13.
"GENERAL CoRPoRATIoN LAW, DEL. REv. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 64A.

The court in the
instant case decided that the transaction before it was not a "sale" within the meaning of this
section because consideration ,for the transfer was paid to the stockholders. See Finch v.
Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 55, 141 AtI. 54, 59 (931).
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to pay the obligations of the transferor, the result reached by the court is satisfactory. The opinion, however, is open to the objections applicable where no
such undertaking is present, for the court puts little reliance on that fact, preferring to rest its decision on the verbal formula of a "de facto merger or consolidation".

CORPORATIONS-TROVER

AND CONVERSION-REMEDY

IN

TROVER WHERE

CORPORATION REFUSES TO ISSUE SHARE CERTIFICATE AND SHAREHOLDER HAS
CONTRACTED NOT TO TRANSFER-Plaintiff, owner of shares of defendant cor-

poration, contracted with defendant and with X and Y 1 not to sell his shares
prior to a certain date without the consent of X and Y.1 Defendant changed its
name, and called in outstanding share certificates to be exchanged for others bearing the new name. Plaintiff accordingly turned in his certificate, and after
marking it "cancelled" defendant notified plaintiff it would issue the new certificate only if plaintiff consented to have written upon it a statement, not on the old
certificate, that the shares were not transferable prior to the date specified in the
contract except with the consent of X and Y. Plaintiff sued in trover for the
conversion of his shares. Held, that the shares had been converted, and plaintiff
could recover the full value of the shares as of the time of defendant's refusal
to issue the certificates.s Veatch v. North European Oil Corp., Del. Super. Ct.,
September 25, 1933.

When a person's interests in a chattel have been invaded under certain circumstances, the common law, in the action of trover, permits him a remedy by
which he can recover the money value of the chattel at the time of the invasion. 4
In such case the defendant is permitted to keep the property.5 Generally, if it is
property of stable value, the defendant loses nothing but the costs of the suit, and
the action is purely remedial. But to the extent that the value depreciates, through
no fault of the defendant, the action has become to some extent punitive. 6
Although this form of action may be desirable in certain cases,' it can hardly
be disputed that a remedy so drastic ought to be carefully guarded by the courts
and not extended except with the utmost caution. Trover as a means of protecting the various incidents of shares 8 is certainly an extension, if not a perversion,
of the traditional common law remedy. The latter is essentially a device for
the protection of possession of chattels, 9 a physical relationship of which in'There were two contracts alleged, the existence and validity of which plaintiff disputed.
However, the court in its opinion treated the contracts as existing and valid.
2 The facts do not reveal the relation of X and Y to the parties.
'This was the only value proved by the plaintiff. There was therefore no question as to
measure of damages in the sense of determining the time at which to fix the value.
" See Dooley v. Gladiator Co., 134 Iowa 468, 471, iop N. W. 864, 865 (i9o6) ; BowERs,
LAW OF CONVERSION (1917) § 630.

'The general rule is that the defendant acquires title by satisfaction of the judgment.

Miller v. Hyde, i6i Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 76o (I894).

6 There is a suggestion in the early cases, when the action of trover was in the first
stages of development, that the essence of the action is the "misdemeanor" of the defendant,
and that innocent wrongs were not so remedied. See Ames, History of Trover (i898) iI,
HARv. L. REV. 374, 384, and cases cited in note 4 thereof.
'If the injury is extensive and the amount of actual damage is not readily calculable it
seems just that the plaintiff should not be put to the necessity of proving the actual extent of
loss, but should be able to abandon the property and recover the full value.
' It is well settled that shares of stock are property subject to conversion. Haskell v.

Middle States Petroleum Corp., 165 Atl. 562 (Del. 1933) ; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 390; Note

(0933) 83 A. L. R. 1199.
'I

STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LrtEnTy (i906) 250.
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corporeal "property", such as a share, is not susceptible. 10 In cases involving
such "property", where the effect of trover is almost invariably to penalize the
defendant,"" the remedy should be limited at least to situations where the duty of
the defendant is clear, and the interference with the plaintiff's interest is real
In the instant case the defendant's responsibility is at least
and substantial.'
doubtful; there is ample ground for the contention that its conduct was entirely
justified." Moreover, a reasonable construction of the facts permits a conclusion
that the plaintiff was not substantially injured by the violation of his alleged right
to an unendorsed certificate; it might be said that the defendant did not in fact
refuse the plaintiff a certificate, but rather tendered a restricted certificate, and
defendant therefore interfered only with such interests incident to a "clean" cer-

tificate as were not incident to a restricted one-in this case merely the privilege
to transfer the shares without the consent of X and Y, an interest which the
plaintiff did not have. If the plaintiff was indeed injured by the defendant's
conduct, it seems more just to both parties, as well as to other persons interested
in the financial condition of the defendant,'4 to limit the plaintiff to remedies
other than trover. 15 Certainly such a result would be consistent with a wise
judicial policy in the development of this new field of the law.
COURTS-APPELLATE JURISDICTION-HEARING OF QUESTION CERTIFIED
FROM A LOWER COURT TO AN APPELLATE COURT BEFORE JUDGMENT IN THE
LOWER COURT AS WITHIN APPELLATE JURISDICTION-A Texas statute, per-

mitted a district court to certify questions involving the constitutionality of a

'0 See

(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 2,7, 218.
A shareholder is unlikely to sue in trover, and relinquish the stock, unless its value has
fallen or will probably fall, and thus the defendant usually pays more in satisfaction of the
judgment than the stock is worth at the time.
"The decided cases are not inconsistent with this proposition. The cases allowing recovery where the defendant is the issuing corporation may be divided into two groups: (I)
Where the conduct of the defendant amounts to a complete denial of the plaintiff's position as
owner of the shares. Salt River Co. v. Hickey, 4 Ariz. 240, 36 Pac. 171 (1894) (unqualified
refusal to issue certificate); Dooley v. Gladiator Co., supra note 4 (unqualified refusal to
register transfer of shares); Carpenter v. American B. & L. Ass'n, 54 Minn. 403, 56 N. W.
95 (893).
(2) Where the conduct of the defendant, though not amounting to a denial of
the plaintiff's ownership, is a material interference with a substantial interest. Ralston v.
Bank of California, 112 Cal. 2o8, 44 Pac. 476 (1896) ; Bank of America v. McNeil, io Bush
54 (Ky. 1874) (cases of qualified refusal to register transfer of shares). But see London
Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 6oi, 605 (C. C. A. 9th, 29o2).
"The argument for the defendant that since its contract with the plaintiff restricted the
latter's privilege to sell his shares and since his transfer of the certificate was the most convenient and practical means of effecting a sale, the contract by reasonable implication gave
the corporation the further privilege of putting the restrictive statement on the certificate, so
that it could protect its rights under the contract by giving notice to prospective purchasers.
The argument against this contention was two-fold: (I) the fact that the defendant had previously issued a "clean" certificate, though the contract was then in existence, indicates that
the parties did not intend the defendant to have the further privilege contended for; (2) in
contracts, generally, restricting the privilege to transfer property there is no safeguard against
the owner's breaking the contract and selling in spite of the restriction.
I The instant decision seems especially unfair to other stockholders, not only because
(assuming that the value of the shares has fallen) the treasury of the corporation is depleted, but because the plaintiff secures an advantage not enjoyed by the other shareholders,
though his interests have in fact been but slightly affected.
The remedies usually permitted in such cases are a bill in equity to compel issuance of
the certificate, Mundt v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 35 Utah go, 99 Pac. 454 (2909) ; or an
action on the case for damages proved to have resulted from the defendant's conduct. ProSee CI.ARtK AND M RsHAILT, PRIVATE
tection Life Ins. Co. v. Osgood, 93 Ill. 69 (1879).
CORPORATIONS (1901) §§ 425 and 6o2.
" TEx. REV. Ciw. CODE (Vernon, 1925, Supp. 1933) art. 185Ia.
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statute or an administrative order to the court of civil appeals and permitted that
court to certify such questions to the supreme court.2 The Texas constitution I
provided that the legislature might confer on the court of civil appeals jurisdiction, original and appellate. Held, that the act permitting certification from the
district courts to the court of civil appeals was unconstitutional in that it could
not be said to be a legitimate exercise of either appellate or original jurisdiction.
Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S. W. (2d) 641 (Texas 1933).

The decision throws into question a method of procedure that has existed
for over a century in the federal courts 4 and has been adopted in a number of
states by constitution 5 and statute.6 The constitutional provisions defining the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the courts of some
of those states in which questions may be certified by statutory authority are
strikingly like those by which the court in the instant case felt that it was bound
to strike down the procedure.' In a recent case,' the Supreme Court has termed
the certification of a question by the circuit court of appeals as "an invocation of
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and therefore within the Constitution." 9
In the states which permit the practice, no case has been found attacking the
validity of the statute.1" In the instant case, the Texas court was evidently swayed
by an impression that its decision would be advisory."1 There was, however,
necessarily under the stipulated procedure, an actual controversy between adverse
parties before the lower court. A determination of the questions of constitutionThe court of civil appeals had been authorized to certify questions to the supreme court
in 1892, TEx. REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 1729.
' Art. 5, sec. 6. After making provision that the court shall have appellate jurisdiction in
certain cases the section reads: "Said courts shall have such other jurisdiction, original and
appellate, as may be prescribed by law ..
'The Act of April 29, 18o2, was the first statute of this nature. It permitted the circuit
courts, when the opinions of the two judges who composed them were opposed, to certify
questions to the Supreme Court for decision. 2 U. S. ST. at L. 159. By 26 STAT. 828 (I89i),
28 U. S. C. A. § 346 (1926) the right of the circuit courts of appeal to certify questions to the
Supreme Court has been enlarged.
'GA. CONST., art. 6, sec. 2, par. 9; LA. CONsT., art. VII, sec. 25; Mo. CoNsT., amendment (1884), sec. 6; N. Y. CoNsT., art. VI, sec. 7 (4) ; OHio CoNsT., art. IV, sec. 6.
'In Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Vermont there are
statutes permitting the certification of questions to appellate courts but there are no provisions in their constitutions limiting the jurisdiction of these courts to original and appellate
jurisdiction.
Cf. U. S. CONSTTUTION, Art. III, Sec. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.") with the Texas constitution,
supra note 3. Cf. also the constitutional provisions in the following states which permit the
procedure in question: Alabama (sec. i4O), North Dakota (sec. 86), Pennsylvania (art. V,
sec. 3), Rhode Island (amendment art. XII) and Wyoming (art. V, sec. 2).
'Old Colony Trust Co. et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 49
Sup. Ct. 499 (1929).
'Id. at 728, 49 Sup. Ct. at 504.
10 In Michigan a statute permitted this form of procedure (2 MicH. Comp. LAws (1857)
sec. 3422) and two cases are on record of its use, Baggs v. City of Detroit, 5 Mich. 66 (1858)
and English v. Fairchild, 5 Mich. 141 (858).
Yet a few years later the practice was repudiated, Sanger et al. v. Truesdail, 8 Mich. 543 (i86o) ; Jones v. Smith, 14 Mich. 334 (1866)
(Curiously, there is no mention in either of these latter cases of the statute; jurisdiction was
cursorily refused because the court had only appellate jurisdiction under the state constitution). See also Aull v. Keener, 17 Ill. 246 (1855).
In Wigmore, All Legislative Rides for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally
(1928) 23 ILL. L. Rxv. 276, the argument is advanced, that "all rules of procedure in courts,
not expressly or impliedly prescribed by the constitution, fall under the judiciary power for
the purpose of making or changing them."
" See instant case at 643.
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ality involved would have been binding on such parties,"2 hence not advisory.
Moreover, the specific holding, that the certificate was unconstitutional since not
within appellate jurisdiction, was reached from an unnecessarily narrow view of
the proper scope of such jurisdiction, in considering it to be limited to the rehearing of causes resolved to final judgment below. This conception was developed
in reasoning that the words "appellate jurisdiction" as used in the constitution
must be interpreted in the restricted common law sense, and that cases cited in
which a common law appeal from an interlocutory order was refused were here
relevant.'x Such an approach necessarily restricts the nature of the jurisdiction
to a definition in terms of the procedural methods existent under the common
law. Considered in terms of inherent quality rather than on a basis of procedural
form, certification would seem to do no violence to the common law concept of
proper appellate action.14 Furthermore, it would seem at least possible to have
interpreted the constitutional provision in question as permissive rather than
restrictive in conferring power upon the legislature.' 5 It is to be regretted that
the court, without sounder justification, has struck down a highly useful procedural device, especially since an incongruous result was coincidently reached by
upholding the practice of certifying questions from the court of civil appeals to
the supreme court on the presumption of propriety proceeding
from a subsequent
6
re-enactment of the relevant sections of the constitution.'
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REMOVAL OF CAUSES-RIGHT TO COMBINE
AMOUNTS INVOLVED IN CONSOLIDATED CASES TO DETERMINE WHETHER JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT HAS BEEN REAcHED--The house of insured was destroyed by fire, allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant. Insurance
company paid $3000 to insured and then sued defendant for that sum. Insured
sued defendant for $3000, the value of the house in excess of the sum paid
by the insurance company. The court consolidated the cases for trial, and defendant petitioned for removal to the federal court. Held, that removal was

possible.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 4 F.

Supp. 25 (E. D. Ky. 1933).
To remove a case from a state court to a federal court the amount in dispute must exceed $3000.' The question has several times arisen in consolidated
' Stevenson v. Cofferin, 2o N. H. 288 (1850).
As to the actual effect of this procedure
under a similar statute see Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Herzberg, 177 Ala. 248, 59
So 305 (1912) (where the questions were answered) and Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co.
v. Herzberg, 5 Ala. App. 330, 59 So. 3o6 (1912) (where the answers were followed as final
by the court which had certified the questions).
Instant case at 649.
Old Colony Trust et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 8, at 728, 49
Sup. Ct. at 504. Cf. the decision of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Virginia, IOO U. S. 339
(1879). There a petition for habeas corpus was held within the Court's appellate power to
hear, the Court saying, "The appellate power is not limited by the Constitution to any particular form or mode. It is not alone by appeal or writ of error that it may be invoked."
The provision in the constitution, supra note 3, might reasonably be understood to mean
that the intent of its drafters was to delegate to the legislature the power of determining what
appellate jurisdiction should be and the power to authorize new mehods of invoking it. Such
was evidently the attitude of the Supreme Court in the Old Colony Trust Co. case, supra note
8, at 728, 49 Sup. Ct. at 504.
" Certification to the Supreme Court had been a recognized practice since its statutory
enactment in 1892. Supra note 2. The court accepted the subsequent re-enactment of the
constitutional provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on this court as a popular mandate
of approval of the statute. Instant case, at 651. Inevitably, it would seem that there was involved in the re-enactment a coincident approval of the broad interpretation of appellate jurisdiction upon which the court in the principal situation turned its back.
'36 STAT. iogi (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 I) 1926.
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cases whether the several claims involved may be combined to ascertain the
amount in dispute. In deciding the principal case, the court distinguished between "consolidation" and "quasi-consolidation", ruling that true consolidation
exists only where the actions combined might have been brought as one and
carried to a single verdict and judgment; but that where they could not have
been brought as one, though involving the same issues and defenses, there is
only "quasi-consolidation". 2 With this as a foundation, the court held that
several claims may be combined to ascertain the amount in dispute only in cases
of "true" consolidation.3 In the principal case it considered that the interest
of the insurer being derived from the insured,4 there was only one cause of
action involved; accordingly the claims might be combined.5 It refused to
follow Cooper v. American Stores Co.,6 in which the amounts in a parent's actions for injuries to his child and an action for his own loss of services were not
combined, on the ground that in that case two distinct interests were there involved which would require two judgments; I it disagreed with the decision in
Holmes v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., in which the amounts in two claims of an
insured against his insurer on two policies for the same loss were not combined,
on the ground that in such a situation the plaintiff might validly have joined
both claims in one action.9 It would appear, however, that the distinction drawn
by the court between "consolidation" and "quasi-consolidation" rests merely
on the rules of common law procedure. Under these rules, only one cause of
action may be brought in one suit; but where one plaintiff has several causes
of action against the same defendant, which involve the same issues and may
be met by the same defenses, all may be joined in one suit.10 The policy underlying the latter rule is found in an attempt to save time and expense by avoiding
unnecessary litigation; 11 and since combination of actions, whether it be "consolidation" or "quasi-consolidation", is merely another device for achieving such
2 Instant case, at 29, 3o. The court states that, though actions may be consolidated,
causes of action, "which inherently are separate and distinct, cannot be merged or combined
into one cause of action. . . . Consolidation of several actions brought upon such causes of
action has no effect upon those causes of action . . . As to whether several actions can be
merged and combined into one, i. e., consolidated, would seem to depend on the question
whether a single action could have been brought embracing the several causes of action. If
so, they
can be consolidated... Otherwise, there can be no consolidation." [All italics added.]
3
Id., at 31, 32, 33, where the court discusses a number of cases involving this problem
and solves them by applying its rule as to what is "consolidation" and what is "quasiconsolidation".
' It is said that the insurer is subrogated to the interest of the insured and that his right
rests on principles of equity, irrespective of any contract between him and the insured. In
this light he appears to be an assignee by operation of law. Pittsburgh & St. Louis R. v.
Home Ins. Co., 183 Ind. 355, io8 N. E. 525 (915) ; Atchison T. & S. Fe. R. v. Home Ins.
Co., 59 Kan. 432, 53 Pac. 459 (I898).
Instant case, at 33.
625 F. (2d) 916 (E. D. Pa. 1928).
' Instant case, at 31. "The consolidation provided for by that statute was not a consolidation of actions. It was no more than 'quasi consolidation'."
142 Fed. 863 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. I9O6).
Instant case, at 31, 32. The court states, "Cooper v. American Stores Co. was just
such a case". The discussion which follows, however, shows that "Cooper v. American
Stores Co." was mistakenly printed for "Holmes v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co.", which is the case
the court had in mind.
10 1 CHITTY, PLEADING (1879) 221, 224; SHIP-MAN, ComaIoN-LAw PLE--DING (Ballantine's ed. 1923) 201, 203.
"The rules cited are so well established that their underlying policy is rarely referred
to in the cases. That this is the policy appeared, however, in a case in which a plaintiff began
two suits against a defendant and the latter filed pleas to the merits in both. The defendant
was held to have waived his right to have them joined, on the theory that the reason for
requiring joinder is to protect him from excessive litigation. Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky.

785, 185 S. W.

129 (1916).
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economy in cases which may not be joined under the rules of procedure, 2 it
is but a broader application of the same policy. There is, therefore, no inherent
distinction between cases combined by the rules of procedure, and cases otherwise combined. Practically, too, there is no distinction. The purpose of requiring the amount in dispute to exceed $3000 is to avoid crowding the federal
docket with small cases.'18 The admission of a "quasi-consolidated" case, in
which the several causes of action involve the same issues and defenses, would
no more defeat this purpose than would the admission of a case in which several causes have been joined by the rules of procedure. True, the verdict and
judgment may have to be framed to satisfy several plaintiffs. But this is only
a matter of form. 4 It is submitted, therefore, that in cases "quasi-consolidated"
equally as in cases which are "consolidated" the several amounts involved should
be combined.

FUTURE INTERESTs-LIENS-NON-APPLICABILITY OF MUNICIPAL LIEN TO
LAND IN HANDS OF EXECUTORY DEVIsEEs-Assignee of municipal assessment

certificates, levied to recover for municipal improvements and which were a lien
on the property improved, sued the defeasible fee holder's administrator and the
executory devisees who inherited on the death of the fee holder for improvements made during the latter's tenure. Held, that no personal judgment could
be recovered against the estate ' and that the lien could not be foreclosed against
property in the hands of the executory devisees. Phelps v. Thurber Brick Co.,
62 S. W. (2d) 596 (Tex. 1933).
The court's refusal to allow foreclosure of the lien against executory devisees who had acquired the fee simple ignores the theory underlying municipal
assessments. 2 Briefly, this theory is to the effect that the property against which
the assessment is levied derives some special benefit from the improvement
commensurate with the lien charges,8 making it no hardship to secure the assessment by a lien. Yet, the court chose to rest its decision on the ill-applied doctrine that remaindermen cannot be held responsible for improvements put on
land by one having only a life tenure. 4 The implication of such a holding would

'Keep

v. St. Louis Ry. Co., io Fed. 454 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1882); Atkinson v. Disher,
(1912) ; Lee v. Township of Kearney, 42 N. J. L. 543 (88o).
'This, too, is so well settled that few cases mention it expressly. It is expressed in
Davis v. Mills, 99 Fed. 39 (C. C. D. Conn. 29oo). It is, however, assumed in other decisions:
Central Paper Co. v. Southwick, 56 F. (t2d) 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) ; Bowden v. Burnham,
59 Fed. 752 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); Brigham-Hopkins Co. v. Gross, 2O7 Fed. 769 (C. C. D.
Wash. i9oi).
" Ellis v. First Nat. Bank, 19 Ariz. 464, 172 Pac. 281 (1918).

177 Ind. 665, 98 N. E. 8o7

'This part of the decision was proper, since assessment certificates are secured by liens
which are not personal but are a charge against the land itself. Moss v. Andrews Asphalt
Paving Co., 229 Ky. 419, 17 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929) ; City of Statesville v. Jenkins, 199 N. C.
159, 254 S. E. 15 (1930); 5 McQuIL.N, MuNXCn'AI, COmRATIONS (2d ed. 1928) §2258;
cf. Morrison v. Culver's Estate, 248 N. W. 237 (Iowa 1933).
' Suit was started after executory devisees acquired the estate. A dissenting opinion
treats them as in the same position as purchasers, against whom the lien is valid, though
upon none too satisfactory reasoning. CHARTER OF CITY OF HOUSTON § 12. Willoughby v.
City of Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, 35 Sup. Ct. 23 (1924) ; Armstrong v. Williamson, 22o Ala.
4,5, 125 So. 681 (193o) ; Heisig v. Vaughan, 15 S. W. (2zd) 113 (Tex. 1929).
'Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 29 Sup. Ct. 187 (x898); Snetzer v. Gregg, 129 Ark.
542, 196 S. W. 925 (2917); City of Knoxville v. Lee, 259 Tenn. 61g, 21 S. W. (2d) 628
(1929); Harrow, Special Assessment Taxes (1929) 22 LAWYER AND BANKER 155; 25

R. C. L. § 79.
'See instant case at 598. The authorities relied on by the court are cases dealing in the
main with improvements put on the land by one whose representatives on his death sue his
heirs. The decisions imply that gratuities were intended and allow no recovery. Clift v.
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be to free any, even vested, remaindermen from sharing the cost of necessary
and proper improvements placed on land, even though later acquiring the estate
at its increased value. The preponderant view is in the case of a life tenancy
succeeded by a remainder to the contrary, the cost being ratably apportioned
between the life tenant and the remainderman depending on the probable duration of the life tenancy and the life of the improvement.5 The court in the instant case undoubtedly confused the executory devisees who had her already
acquired the fee simple, with executory devisees and contingent remaindermen
who have not at the time of suit acquired a vested interest. Despite the fact
that their interest occupies an established position in the law, the latter have
only the possibility of acquiring an estate.7 This uncertain interest cannot before vesting be said to have received any benefit so as to be responsible for
even a portion of the assessment." Likewise, it is practicably impossible to
apportion the cost where the improvements are made during a defeasible fee
holder's tenure, for the reason that the chance of the happening of the event
which will divest his estate is incapable of estimate.9 In such cases, 10 it is subnitted, the most practical adjustment would be to compel the one holding the
estate when the improvements are made to pay the entire cost. Then, on the
expiration of his estate, if the succeeding estate acquires any benefit," the representative of the one divested may recover from those succeeding him a proportionate share of the cost,' 2 or even have a lien against the land for such part.
Likewise, in the instant case, had the executory devisees been required to discharge the lien, they in turn should have been able to proceed against
the de13
feasible fee holder's estate for his proportion of the assessment.
Clift, 72 Tex. 144, 10 S. W. 338 (1888) ; Heidelberg v. Behrens, 85 S. W. lO29 (Tex. 19o5);
Dearing v. Jordon, 130 S. W. 836 (Tex. igio); Burns v. Parker, 137 S. W. 705 (Tex.
1911); Richmond v. Sims, 144 S. W. 1142 (Tex. 1912); Ely v. Moore, 297 S. W. 795
(Tex. 1927).
'Troy v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 174 Ala. 38D, 56 So. 982 (1911); Wordin's
Appeal, 71 Conn. 531, 42 Atl. 659 (1899) ; Huston v. Tribbetts, 17, Ill. 547, 49 N. E. 711
(1898); Kline v. Dowling, 176 Ind. 521, 96 N. E. 579 (1911); Chamberlin v. Gleason, 163
N. Y. 214, 57 N. E. 487 (igoo) ; In re Whitney, 75 Misc. 61o, 136 N. Y. Supp. 633 (1912) ;
R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Babbitt, 22 R. I. 113, 46 Atl. 403 (19oo) ; Sheffield v. Cooke, 39
R. I. 217, 98 Atl. 161 (1916).
In fixing the probable duration of the life tenancy courts resort to mortality tables. For
a most elaborate formula of apportionment see Lamar, Joint Assessments for Improvements
(1928) 6 TEx. L. REV. 432.
0 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 19o2) § 1557.

'Tiffany, Future Estates (1913) 29 L. Q.
8

REv. 29o.

See Wordin's Appeal, supra note 3, at 538, 42 Atl. at 662; Lamar, supra note 5, at 444.

'For example, X to have the fee simple until the next war between France and Germany,
when Y will inherit.
' Where the remainderman is contingent, not vested; and where there is a defeasible
fee holder and executory devisee.
' The improvements (and consequently the increased value to the estate) may have
vanished during the present estate, in which case it is only just that the entire cost be borne
by the one paying the charges originally.
' Such is the prevailing view when the life tenant alone pays an assessment to prevent
the sale of the estate in satisfaction of the lien and then proceeds against the remaindermen
who are to inherit. Garrett v. Snowden, 226 Ala. 3o, 145 So. 493 (933) ; Daviess v. Myers,
13 Monroe 511 (Ky. 1852); Chambers v. Chambers, 20 R. I. 370, 39 Atl. 243 (1898); cf.
Troy v. Protestant Episcopal Church; Chamberlin v. Gleason, both supra note 5. See
Eliason v. Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260, at 263 (1869).
"Where remaindermen pay taxes they can recover from the life tenant, and they may
have a lien on his interest for the amount paid. Ussery v. Sweet, 137 Ark. 14o, -08 S. W.
6oo (1919) ; Figgins v. Figgins, 53 Ind. App. 43, 1oi N. E. 1IO (1913) ; Abernathy v. Orton,
42 Ore. 437, 71 Pac. 327 (1903).
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TORTS-NTEGLIGENCE-NUISANCE-DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED TO AVOID
INJURING ONE MAINTAINING A NUISANCE CONTRIBUTING TO His INJURY-In
action for injuries sustained when defendant's automobile struck rope stretched
across highway by plaintiff,1 court charged that, plaintiff having maintained a

negligent nuisance, 2 the verdict should be for defendant unless defendant's conduct was equivalent to indifference to consequences.3

Held, on exception to the

charge, that the instructions were erroneous as precluding the jury's consideration
of "defendant's duty to use reasonable care."
1933).

Hill v. Way, 168 Atl. I (Conn.

The principal case represents an application of a doctrine followed in a
recent New York decision, 4 which held that a plaintiff might not avert the consequences of his own negligent conduct by affixing to the negligence of defendant
the label of nuisance. " The situation is here novel, however, in that the plaintiff
has created the nuisance. Since in the usual case the defendant's maintenance of
a nuisance will not lessen the degree of care required of plaintiff, the court properly decided that defendant was not relieved from exercising ordinary care merely
by a plea of plaintiff's maintaining a negligent nuisance. But the novel situation
here presented by the plaintiff's having maintained the nuisance involves issues
not raised by the pleadings in the instant case-those of contributory negligence
and last clear chance. The nuisance may be of two types: (I) where the negligence resulting in its creation continues until the injury; (2) where the negligence has ceased, resulting in a static condition of helplessness from which
plaintiff is now unable to extricate himself. In either situation, in case of a
defendant's plea of contributory negligence, recovery can only be predicated upon
the doctrine of last clear chance. To allow a negligent plaintiff recovery under
this doctrine, there must in fact be a final clear opportunity in defendant to avert
the accident notwithstanding plaintiff's negligence either because, under the
hypothesis of class (2), defendant failed to use reasonable care to discover
plaintiff's inextricable peril; 6 or, in the situation presented in class (I), defendant
actually discovered plaintiff's negligent inattention and was negligent in thereafter
failing to save the plaintiff. 7 Under any other situation the negligence of the
actors is on the same plane and recovery should be denied under orthodox contributory negligence prinicples.8 It appears in the principal case that both parties
The rope was used to draw iron rails from beneath a structure, one end of the rope
being attached to a rail, the other to plaintiff's truck on the opposite side of the highway.
When pulled taut intermittently at plaintiff's signal, the rope was twenty-six inches above
the surface of the road. Plaintiff gave no warning of the existence of the rope, although it
was his duty to give such warning.
'That this was a negligent nuisance is also conceded by the parties and the upper court,
principal case at 2, 3.
' Also apparently nonexistent: instant case at 2, 3. Such conduct exists only when the
actor manifests indifference with reference to conscious imminent danger, Atchison, etc., R.
Co. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 8o4 (I9O8) ; 3 CooLxv, TORTS (4th ed. 1932) § 484.
'MacFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, I6o N. E. 39i (1928).
'Only where one maintains an "absolute" nuisance--such as is inherently dangerous to
life and limb-is recovery permitted despite the injured party's failure to exercise self-protective care, Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195 (i878).
' Plaintiff's negligence must render him unable to save himself at some time after which
the exercise of reasonable care by defendant would avoid the injury, TORTS RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. 1933), Tentative Draft No. I0, § 15. Recovery is then permitted on the theory

that plaintiff's negligence has ceased and that defendant's negligence is the proximate cause
of the injury, Payne v. Healey, I39 Md. 86, 114 Atl. 693 (ig2i) ; Teakle v. San Pedro, etc.,
R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402 (1907).
I ToRTs RESTATEMiENT, Tentative Draft No. io, § i6. Recovery is here had on the same
theory stated supra note 6, Cavanaugh v. Boston and M. R. R., 76 N. H. 68, 79 Atl. 694
(Igu).
ILanfare v. Putnam, 115 Conn. 267, i6i Atl. 242 (1932) ; Chabott v. Grand Trunk R.
Co., 77 N. H. 133, 88 At. 995 (1913).
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were negligent, and that this mutual negligence was actively operative until the
injury.9 Had the defendant here pleaded contributory negligence, therefore
rather than the mere fact that plaintiff was maintaining a nuisance, a charge in his
favor would have been proper.'0

TRUSTs-LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN-DISCOUNT ON PURCHASE
OF BONDS AS ACCRUING TO INCOME OR CoRPus-Trustee under a will purchased

bonds at a discount ' and resold them several years later at slightly above par
value. Testator's widow excepted to account filed by trustee on the ground that
profit realized above the purchase price of bonds was income due her as life beneficiary. Held, that such profits accrued to the corpus of the trust and that the
life beneficiary was not entitled to them. In re Houston's Will, 105 Atl. 132

(Del. Ch. 1933).
Cases involving the disposition of discount profits on bonds have previously
come directly before a court on but two occasions and on both were decided as
the instant case.2 Legal opinion outside the meager case law takes quite the
opposite view.- It is to the effect that, since the majority rule has crystallized in
favor of amortizing premiums 4 paid on bonds out of interest received,5 logic
compels that discounts be turned over to the life tenant.6 This is based on the
postulate that bond prices vary only because of their interest rate. But as a
matter of actual financial experience this assumption is inaccurate. 7

Many other

factors contribute, especially the comparative risk involved even in bonds which
meet requirements for trust investment. There is also no doubt that supply and
'Defendant did not see the rope, principal case at 2. Plaintiff was not looking toward
the highway at the moment of collision, principal case at 3.
" Although it would not seem that the court intended to require a contrary result in case
of such a plea, certain broad statements that defendant was under a "duty to exercise reasonable care" are susceptible of misinterpretation. Should such a duty be required in spite of
plaintiff's continuing negligence, the incongruity would be presented of defendant's being required to exercise greater care for plaintiff's safety than the latter must exercise to protect
himself. That this is not the law in Connecticut, see Lanfare v. Putnam, supra note 8; Correnti v. Catino, 115 Conn. 213, 16o Atl. 892 (1932) ; Bujnak v. Connecticut Co., 94 Conn. 468,
lop Atl. 244 (ig2o) ; Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. lo9, 84 Atl. 30 (1912).
Discount on a bond is the difference between par value and the purchase price below
par. pri re Gartenlaub's Estate,
198 Cal. 204, 244 Pac. 348 (1926) ; Townsend v. U. S. Trust
Co., 3 Redf. Surr. 220 (N. Y. 1877).
32 PERRY, TRuSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 548b; BOGERT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS
(I92I) § IO3; Edgerton, Premiumis and Discounts in Truwt Accounts (I91S) 31 HARv. L.
REV. 447; Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 684; (1926) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 66.
'Premium on a bond is the difference between par value and the purchase price above
par. It is amortized by setting aside periodically a certain amount of the interest received so
that by the time the bond is paid, the amount of the premium has been saved.
'In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 648, 198 Pac. 209 (i92I) ; Curtis v. Osborn, 79
Conn. 555, 65 Atl. 968 (1907) ; New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 14o Mass. 532, 4 N. E. 69
(1886) ; Ballantine v. Young, 74 N. J. Eq. 572, 70 AtI. 668 (19o8) ; Matter of Stevens, 187
N. Y. 471, 8o N. E. 358 (19o7) ; Wells' Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1914). Contra: American Security & Tr. Co. v. Payne, 33 App. D. C. 178 (19o9) ; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky.
257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892) ; Penn-Gaskell's Estate No. 2, 208 Pa. 346, 57 Atl. 715 (1904).
Though there is apparently no Delaware case dealing with premiums, the general tenor of the
court's dictum in the principal case leans toward the majority view.
6 The California court was thus vigorously attacked in the A. L. R. note, supra note 3,
after In re Gartenlaub's Estate, supranote 2, since but a few years earlier in another Gartenlaub case, supra note 5, it had decided in favor of amortizing premiums.
7 See Hemmenway v. Hemmenway, 134 Mass. 446, 449 (1883) ; New England Trust Co.
v. Eaton, supra note 5, at 545, 4 N. E. at 79; MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOcK EXCHANGE
(1930) 258.
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demand of bonds on the market will have a bearing on price. Furthermore accidental factors, among which the court classes "market whims", have their effect.
These elements should place discount profits in the same category with other
profits realized on securities which undeniably belong to corpus.8 So, the court
in the principal case arrived at the conclusion that, ".

.

. it is more apt to serve

the ends of practical justice to say that, generally speaking, discounts when
realized constitute capital gains." 9 This holding is fostered by a desire to preserve the corpus as effectuating the testator's intention with respect to the remainderman. Examination of the cases favoring premium amortization reveals the
same fundamental basis for their decisions.1 0 The two lines of cases would thus
appear to be in harmony rather than in conflict. 1 Though not yet adopted by
any state, a Uniform Principaland Income Act 12 was drafted in 1931 covering
both premiums and discounts. For simplicity of trust administration, it provides
that corpus only is affected by either,1 3 thus adopting the minority view in the
case of premium bonds and the view of the instant case in reference to discounts.
TRUSTS-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-AmOUNT OF CONSTRUCTIVrE TRUST
WHERE TENANT BY ENTIRETY KILLS Co-TENANT-Husband and wife held title

to property by the entirety, she being the elder by four years. Husband killed
wife and then killed himself. Held, that title in fee vested in the husband as
survivor, subject to a trust in favor of the wife's heirs to the extent of one-half
of the net income of the property for the number of years of the wife's normal
expectancy of life, ascertained according to mortality tables. Shernar v. Weber,
167 Atl. 517 (N. J. Eq. 1933).
On the theory that a court does not have the power civilly to deprive a person
of any legal rights because of his crime,' and that to allow one to acquire rights
through his commission of a felonious homicide would be unjust, some courts
have held that the criminal slayer of one at whose death he gets property rights
does acquire legal title to such property, but that it is held subject to a trust in
'li re Canfield's Estate, IO4 Cal. App. I8I, 258 Pac. 363 (193o) ; Chase v. Union National Bank, 275 Mass. 503, 176 N. E. 508 (I93).
o Principal case at 135.
See cases cited supra note 5. Some of the courts may speak further of the theory that
interest on premium bonds represents a return of the premium as well as income, but it is
obvious that this suggestion is merely an added justification. Their basic legal reason is the
preservation of corpts.
' TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) Tentative Draft No. 4, § 231 (d) covers
premium cases and states the majority rule as the law. No mention is made of any discount
cases, probably because so few have been litigated.
' HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

(i931) 328.
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 6.

A considerable number of courts refuse to limit in any way the rights that a killer gets
upon his victim's death, basing their decision on the grounds that: (I) devolution of property
is controlled by statutes of descent and distribution or, in the case of tenancy by the entirety,
by the nature of the estate as originally created, and any changes must be made by legislative
enactment; (2) any denial of inheritance or survivorship because of crime would be punishment in addition to the criminal's sentence and would (3) violate the constitutional provision
(inagainst corruption okf blood. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. i8o, xo6 N. E. 785 (914)
heritance) ; Owens v. Owens, Ioo N. C. 24o, 6 S. E. 794 (1888) (dower); Beddingfield v.
Estill & Newman, i18 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. IO8 (19o7); Hamer v. Kinman, 16 D. & C. 395
(Pa. 1931) (both cases of estate by the entirety). Contra: i re Tyler, 140 Wash. 679, 250
Pac. 456 (1926) (killer not permitted to get any legal rights) (inheritance) ; Sharpless v.
Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W., 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. io86 (i916) (life insurance); Van
Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (I918) (estate by the entirety).
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favor of those persons whose interests in the property would otherwise be taken
away by the crime.' Such constructive trust has been imposed where one tenant
by the entirety kills his co-tenant 8 since, even though in legal theory the death of
one tenant vests no new interest in the other,4 there is an acquisition of substantial
benefits by the survivor I which justifies the application of equitable principles to
prevent his unjust enrichment. But though the expedient of a constructive trust
has been definitely adopted by some courts, they have not determined the extent
of the trust in any satisfactory or uniform manner. Since the basis of the constructive trust, not only in cases of tenancies by the entirety, but also in cases of
devise, inheritance, and life insurance policies, is the prevention of unjust enrichment of the killer at the expense of the victim's heirs, the amount of the trust
should logically be the amount of such unjust deprivation of the cestuis. In the
instant case, the court gave the heirs of the wife the income of one-half of the
estate for her life expectancy, determined according to mortality tables. The
theory here was that this was the extent of the deprivation of the wife's heirs since
the husband was younger and would normally survive, receiving the entire property.7 Although the court, in using a comparison of the relative life expectancies
of killer and victim as a basis for determining the amount of the unjust enrichment of the killer, adopts a desirable technique, it does not carry it to its logical
conclusion. The opinion would seem to make mortality tables the sol6 test for
determining life expectancy,' irrespective of considerations of health and habits.'
Secondly, it does not fully base the division of the estate on the relative life
expectancies of killer and victim, but gives the entire estate to the one having
the longer life expectancy, disregarding the fact that the younger individual may
have a substantial, though lesser, possibility of surviving the elder. The proper
solution would seem to be to construct a trust in favor of the victim's heirs to
2

This view finds its authority in the equitable principle that no one shall be permitted to

found a claim on his wrongdoing.

Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crine and

Keep It? (1897) 36 Am. L. REG. (N. s.) 225, reprinted in AMEs, LECTURES ON LE.AL HistORY (1913) 310; Note (igi6) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307; I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929)
§ 183a;
3 PomsERoY, EQIITY JURISPRUDENCE ( 4 th ed. 1918) §§ 1044, 1053, 1054 n. b.
3
Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927) ; Barnett v. Couey,

913,27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930).
' Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878) ; Gibson v. Zimmerman,

224

Mo. App.

12 Mo. 385 (2849).
' It has been held that an interest capable of taxation passes on the death of one tenant
by the entirety. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (193o) ; (930) 79
U. OF PA. L. REV. 233.
'In Barnett v. Couey, supra note 3, the estate was divided equally. In Bryant v. Bryant,
supra note 3, the division was similar to that of the principal case (see infra note 7). In
Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896), a case of devise, the trust was of
the entire estate.
'In New Jersey and a number of other jurisdictions, the common-law right of the husband to the sole enjoyment and profits of an estate held with his wife by the entirety has been
held to be divested by the Married Woman's Property Acts. Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N. J.
Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695 (1887) ; WALSH, PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) § 203; Note (1912) 12 CoL. L.
REv. 539. In Bryant v. Bryant, supra note 3, decided in a state where the husband's commonlaw right is unimpaired, a slayer who had a shorter life expectancy than his victim was
allowed to retain the profits and management of the estate during his life, but upon his death,
the property was to go to the heirs of his victim. The amount of the trust thus appears to
have been determined by the same test adopted by the instant court.
8 Although the language of the court is clear to this effect, since there is no indication
that evidence as to health and habits was presented, the court may have intended merely to
state a rule applicable to this case alone.
I Cases considering health and habits in determining life expectancy: Damm v. Damm,
(ascertainment of interest of life tenant) ; Atchison, T.
2O9 Mich. 619, 67 N. W. 984 (1896)
& S. F. R. Co. v. Hughes, 55 Kan. 491, 40 Pac. 919 (2895) (amount of loss in death action) ;
American Blower Co. v. McKenzie, 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. W. 829 (1929) (determination of
value of widow's, inchoate right of dower).
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the extent of the victim's expectancy in half of the income of the property "o
plus a portion of the reversion determined by the chances of the victim surviving
the killer. 1 The same method would appear applicable not only to cases of estates
by the entirety, but, in the absence of statute,'12 to cases where a devisee kills his
testator, an heir
kills his ancestor, or a beneficiary of a life insurance policy kills
3
the insured.1

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES-RIGHT OF RECIPIENT
OF POOR RELIEF TO COMPENSATION AFTER RENDERING SERVICES IN RETURN
FOR SucH RELIEF-Plaintiff, injured while working for city under Scrip Relief
Plan I made application for workmen's compensation. Held, (three judges dissenting) that plaintiff was not an "employee" of the city and therefore was not
entitled to compensation under the Workmne's Compensation Act.2 Vaivida v.
City of Grand Rapids, 249 N. W. 826 (Mich. 1933).
The instant case presents the novel question of whether a person employed
by a governmental agency in pursuance of a plan of purely sociological relief is
within the purview of the workmen's compensation acts. To the majority of
this court it was apparently clear that such a situation was not within the scope
of the Act, the conclusion being reasoned on the ground that the relation of master
and servant did not exist, since the defendant city was entitled to the service of
the plaintiff as "a counterpart of its statutory duty to care for poor persons." 3
The dissent, on the other hand, assumed that the situation could be brought within
the intended purview of the Act if the technical requirements of an employeremployee relationship as defined by the express terms of the statute could be
found to exist. It found such requirements satisfied, in that there was on the
0

In order accurately to determine the victim's expectancy in the income of the property,
the chances of the killer predeceasing the victim would have to be deducted from the victim's
life expectancy.
See (193o) 44 HRv. L. REv. I25.
Some states have statutes specifically covering the case of inheritance by a killer. IND.
ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 3376; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 20, § 136. Covering
the case of receipt of insurance proceeds by a killer: OKLA. COmP. STAT. ANN. (1931)
§ i616.
'Although an element lacking in estates by the entirety-power of the victim before his
death to transfer the interests in the property to another or otherwise cut off the killer's interest-is present in such cases, the probability of such power being exercised is unknowable,
and should therefore not prevent the application of the same technique for determining unjust
enrichment as that applied to tenancies by the entirety. The amount of the constructive trust
would be a portion of the estate or proceeds of the policy determined by the victim's chances
of surviving the killer, and the cestuis would be those persons who would have taken the
property if the killer had predeceased the victim. For a discussion of some aspects of the
insurance question see (1932) 8i U. OF PA. L. REv. 227.
'The Plan "required" persons receiving poor relief from the city to work if they were
able. (This requirement was, however, extra-legal, see infra note 4.) The workers received
scrip which they could exchange at the city store for goods. The city determined the number of hours per week of work on the needs of the applicant and his family. The compensation received was the equivalent to that received as poor relief before the institution of the
Plan. The work consisted of doing odd jobs for the city.
- MIcE. CoMp. LAWs (1929) § 8413 et seq.
' The court cited 48 C. J. 543.
This authority is predicated on cases holding that a municipality has a right to the earnings of paupers boarded out to individuals. McCarthy v.
Hinman, 35 Conn. 538 (1869) ; Clinton v. Benton, 49 Me. 550 (1862) ; Abbot v. Town of
Fremont, 34 N. H. 432 (857).
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part of both city and individual a voluntary entrance into the arrangement 4 and
that the city controlled the manner of doing the work.5 Apparently both sides
of the court touched only tangentially upon what would seem to be the fundamental problem involved-whether workmen's compensation acts, essentially
designed to place on industry the burden of industrial accidents, are to be held
to cover a state's sociological efforts to provide for its unemployed. Of novel
impression in this country, the situation has definitely been held within the English Act by the courts of that country. 6 Granting obvious distinctions from the
case of industrial employment, the fact that the governmental agency derives at
least some material advantage from the employment I and the fact that the person
so employed may very well be injured so severely as far to outweigh the benefits
to him of the relief, it would seem that there is ground for holding the situation
one of the sort which the acts were intended to relieve. The fact that Michigan,
almost alone among the states, exercises a strict interpretation of its Act, s may
provide an explanation for the conclusion of the instant decision. A more liberal
result may be expected in other jurisdictions.'
'The dissenting opinion pointed out that while the city was required by statute to support plaintiff (MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8229), there was no statute which gave it authority to compel plaintiff to render services for such relief, or placed it under an obligation
to provide work for the unemployed; that accordingly it might properly be said that both
parties had freely contracted.
By OHio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 193o) § 3493, male applicants for poor relief are
required to work if they are able, to the value of the relief received. Because of this compulsory service, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, held that a person working under a plan
similar to the one in the principal case, was not an "employee" of the city. City of Columbus v. Greenlee, Ohio Industrial Commission, June 5, 1932.
The city controlled and dictated the rate of wages, hours of labor, and condition of employment. Principal case at 828.
'Where the injured workmen were employed by a body created by statute to provide
work for the unemployed, they were held to be "employees" within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Porton v. Central (Unemployed) Body of London, 2 B. W. C. C. 296 (191o) ;
Gilroy v. Mackie, 2 B. W. C. C. 269 (igio). The court extended this doctrine to a person
working for relief in a private institution in Macgillivray v. Northern Counties Institute for
the Blind, 4 B. W. C. C. 429 (1911). This case seemingly overrules Burns v. Manchester,
etc., Mission, 99 L. T. R. 579 (19o9), where a contrary result was reached.
'Even though it was asserted that jobs were "made" to provide work and that many of

the jobs were unnecessary and trivial, it remains, much or all the work had some benefit to
the city,
utilitarian or aesthetic. Principal case at 827.
8
As in derogation of the common law. See Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182
Mich. 298, 303, 148 N. W. 684, 686 (1914) ; Luyk v. Hertel, 242 Mich. 445, 447, 219 N. W.
722, 723 (1928).

' Most courts being mindful of the essentially remedial character of the workmen's compensation acts have held that they should be liberally and broadly construed. i HONNOLD.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1918) art. 2, § 6.

